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Abstract—The ability to analyze network threats is very
important in security research. Traditional approaches, involving
sandboxing technology are limited to simulating a single host,
missing local network attacks. This issue is addressed by de-
signing a threat analysis framework that uses software-defined
networking for simulating arbitrary networks. The presented
system offers flexibility, allowing a security researcher to define
a virtual network that is able to capture malicious actions and to
be restored to the initial state afterwards. Both the framework
design and common usage scenarios are described. By providing
this framework, we aim to ease the analysis effort in combating
cyberthreats.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most cyberthreats nowadays propagate through computer
networks, bypassing the borders of a single host. Modern
threat intelligence must consider this aspect while analyzing
new threats or new malware. Observing the behavior of a
given threat, isolated on a single host is not enough, as some
malicious actions are only performed in a real-world network.
Traditional malware research uses virtual machines for
dynamic analysis [1]. Virtual machines are handy because they
represent a controlled environment, where suspicious software
can be run and the system changes can be observed, while
having the ability to restore the environment to the original
state.
For instance, we can analyze a ransomware sample [2],
[3] by running it in a virtual machine. The ransomware will
perform some malicious actions, like encrypting files and
leaving ransom notes. The analysis (automated or manual)
can detect these actions, either by monitoring the ransomware
actions or by comparing the state of the machine after the
infection with the initial state. After the analysis have been
performed, the original snapshot can be restored, preparing
the VM for another analysis. In case of a backdoor or bot [4],
besides the actions performed on the infected host, a complete
analysis should also examine the network interactions, as this
type of malware communicates with a Command and Control
server located on the Internet.
However, there are malware samples and hacking tools
that are not only directed towards the Internet but also look
inside the local network for potential targets. If the simulated
environment is limited to a single host, connected or not to
the Internet, little information can be gathered regarding the
network behavior of the analyzed threat. The current paper
proposes a framework designed to overcome this limitation, by
extending the sandbox machine concept to a sandbox network.
We achieve the proposed goal by employing software-
defined networking [5], a concept that allows defining a
virtual network programmatically, offering both elasticity and
scalability.
The next section presents similar approaches that we came
across while designing the framework presented in this paper.
Section III presents the framework architecture, both network-
wise and functionality-wise. The experimental results follow,
where we present some common network attacks successfully
detected by our framework and some considerations regarding
performance. The paper ends with the conclusions section.
Among our contributions, worth mentioning are the fact
that virtual networks created using the framework reside on
the system itself with high level of interaction with host
OS firewall, routes and interfaces, while still preserving the
much entailed level of isolation of the host from potentially
malicious virtual network activity. Also, easy configuration of
hosts prior to network creation proves facile by using high
level abstraction at the created framework level.
II. RELATED WORK
The mininet SDN Framework[6], appeared in 2012, and as
its authors concisely affirm: ”Mininet creates virtual networks
using process-based virtualization and network namespaces -
features that are available in recent Linux kernels. In Mininet,
hosts are emulated as bash processes running in a network
namespace, so any code that would normally run on a Linux
server (like a web server or client program) should run just
fine within a Mininet ”Host”.”. It became quite popular and
mature, hence already being available for usage as both a
standalone, custom built virtual machine, and as a software
package available on official Linux repositories, such as the
apt, used by Debian-based distributions. As the official page of
mininet shows, a considerable number of publications surfaced
in the domain of SDN thanks to their implementation.
By comparing and contrasting our approach with [6], a
series of obvious differences emerge. While [6] provides a
vast range of functionalities, our emphasis on security research
using SDN fails to benefit greatly from the framework. First
of all, bypassing network isolation proves a difficult task,
and the user needs to rely solely on the APIs available in978-1-5386-8445-0/18/$31.00 c©2018 IEEE
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the framework itself. While we also assured isolation of a
virtual network, our solution also focuses on comprehensive
interaction between a virtual network and the underlying
host operating system. More exactly, our focus lead to the
following: enabling easy addition to the network of virtual
machines or real ones, toggling Internet connectivity of the
network, easy reconfiguration of network structure without
an impact on performance. An analysis on scalability with
mininet has been carried out in [7], proving the efficiency of
using lightweight virtualization for creating virtual networks,
an encouraging aspect in validation of our implementation.
The authors of [8] place emphasis on utility of SDN in
security research, and also shed light upon the fact that popu-
larity of SDN increases faster among networking professionals
than with security researchers. Their publication brings strong
arguments backed up by existing examples from the SDN
security community, showing the advantages of using virtual
networks in securing networks in a novel manner. Among the
SDN systems that bring novelty to security, worth mentioning
are dynamic control of malicious or suspicious network flows,
a centralized monitoring system for detection of network
flooding or network anomalies, and even the development of
network programming languages for easy deployment. While
our approach utilizes SDN for security research, [8] presents
use of SDN for securing a real network, aspect which shall
prove useful for future work.
An interesting approach towards network security using
SDN is presented in [9]. The authors make use of the popular
virtual network framework mininet[6] in order to perform
reconnaissance deception. Basically, by leveraging the power
of software defined networking, each real host in a network
presents to the others a bogus image of the network, once
taking part in a network scanning activity. While network
deception fails to replace security scanning, the mechanism
greatly aids in increasing the time needed for an insider to
infer the layout and structure of the real network. Compared
to our solution, [9] shows an interesting usage of an existing
framework, while we illustrate the creation of a framework for
creating virtual networks for use in security research.
III. FRAMEWORK ARCHITECTURE
A. Overview
While designing and experimenting with the SDN frame-
work, a series of compulsory requirements have emerged. The
first aspect, and probably the most critical: it should be able
to run on commodity hardware, including a personal laptop,
while in the same time having the ability to model hundreds of
real network hosts, each with customizable services exposed
(e.g. FTP, HTTP, SSH).
An issue that surfaced early on in the testing phase is
that emulation of services fails to deliver realistic results,
since many exploits only utilize their malicious payloads on
detection of real, very specific services. Basically, emulated
services represent bogus output exposed to attackers, which
perfectly matches the one of a real application. During recon-
naissance of their target network and systems, most attackers
resort to banner grabbing. This technique, as described in
[10], consists of connecting to a remote application using
network Swiss army knife tools such as nc, described in
[11]. In most cases, exact version of software surfaces to the
malicious scanner. Usually, service emulation solutions also
cover banner grabbing, together with response to common
commands specific to a network service. Despite these efforts,
many automatic bots rarely get tricked into triggering their
malicious act.
The SDN framework provides elasticity in the usage for
creating a virtual network, and for the scenarios tested, we
chose 3 virtual machines, namely: victim, attacker, scanner.
The number of network hosts, though, can easily be extended
to the hundreds, if not thousands without using additional
VMs. Moreover, the additional hosts are able to expose real
services on the network, with the particularity that they must
be installed on the victim VM.
Making use of not only simple, non-VM virtual hosts, but
also VMs in our framework stems from service emulation
negatively affecting expected detection outcome. In order to
obtain scenarios as realistic as possible, these hosts need to
reveal real network services, with the possibility of vastly
extending their variety. As a victim machine hosting various
network services, we chose the popular Metasploitable, which
as its creators affirm, represents ”a test environment [...]
a secure place to perform penetration testing and security
research”. While virtual machines deliver excellent feedback
in security research, using more than 3 VMs on a typical laptop
can seriously take a toll on the host machine functionality.
The other two virtual machines in our test setup, namely
attacker and scanner, were also chosen with regard to their
specificity. The attacker VM represents an installation of an
x86 Windows OS. The motivation behind our choice lies
in the fact that many malware families exist for Windows,
and the scope of our framework targets exactly having the
ability to collect network traffic information with malware or
malicious network activities. In addition, we have installed
some popular pentesting tools compiled for Windows, such
as network scanning tool nmap and brute force password
cracking tool Hydra[12]. The first one aids in performing
discovery and analysis of neighboring hosts and their services
in a network, while the second one employs automation by
leveraging the power of dictionary attacks. Finally, the scanner
VM represents a version of the well-known Debian-based
Linux distribution, Security Onion[13]. It comes as a great aid
in detection of malicious network activities, by using a series
of specific, pre-installed IDS tools such as Bro, Suricata or
Snort. In addition, the authors of Security Onion encourage
the security researcher utilizing this distribution to spend
days, weeks tailoring the stack of dedicated security tools,
for example by adding new signatures for detection.
Worth mentioning in the end are the fact that the attacker
virtual machine could be used in order to model the attacker
from inside the virtual network, while victims are the victim
virtual machine together with all the non-VM, virtual redirec-
tor nodes, that map certain ports onto ports of services that
need to be installed on the victim machine.
B. Network-wise Architecture
At the core of the SDN Framework lie features in the
Linux Kernel itself. First of all, the core of a virtual network
represents the Linux Bridge, which acts as a gateway for the
virtual network itself. With security in mind, both of the host
computer, and of a real network bearing the system as one of
its hosts, we carefully chose Linux Firewall rules and chains,
in order to have isolation of the virtual network. On the other
hand, the virtual network may be configured to have Internet
access, but DNS configuration at host level remains a task for
the human actor, in order to avoid accidental Internet leaks.
Fig. 1: An overview of a virtual network implemented using
our framework. The VM-label rectangles represent the follow-
ing, by color: pink-victim, red-attacker, green-scanner. Next
to each NIC symbol is the interface name in Linux. mybridge
represents the virtual network bridge.
Linux Network Namespaces and Linux virtual Ethernet de-
vices lie at the heart of each non-VM host in the network. Con-
cerning namespaces in the Linux operating system, the Linux
Manpages[14] entry for namespaces provides relevant pieces
of information: ”A namespace wraps a global system resource
in an abstraction that makes it appear to the processes within
the namespace that they have their own isolated instance of
the global resource. Changes to the global resource are visible
to other processes that are members of the namespace, but
are invisible to other processes. One use of namespaces is to
implement containers”. Basically, a virtual, non-VM host in
our SDN solution represents a network namespace having a
network interface that connects using virtual Ethernet to a veth
pair interface in the default network namespace, which in turn
connects to the virtual network bridge.
Since each non-VM host in the virtual network we cre-
ated represents solely a networking context, we benefit from
lightweight virtualization, allowing the existence of as many
such hosts as the network address range allows us, without
there appearing noticeable impact on performance. Further-
more, leveraging the capabilities of NAT (Network Address
Translation), each such host allows a mapping of its own port
to a port of the victim machine, in order to deceive the attacker
that the virtual host actually exposes certain services on the
network on certain ports, while in reality they exist on the
victim virtual machine, this being a requirement.
With automation in mind to an extend as vast as possible,
we chose to utilize networking capabilities of the underlying
host operating system. Therefore, the 3 virtual machines,
victim, attacker and scanner programmatically receive DHCP
lease reservation upon creation or modification of the virtual
network.
A particularity of the chosen setup aims at not only obtain-
ing an isolated network, but also assuring in-depth scanning
of the network traffic. In order to do so, the so-called scanner
virtual machine connects to the virtual network in promiscuous
mode and also benefits from port mirroring such that all the
network traffic from the bridge gets replicated in the scanner
interface. A significant aspect that entails attention represents
hiding the scanner machine, while at the same time assuring
that it can communicate with the bridge, in order to receive a
copy of its entire traffic, and also the DHCP configuration. The
solution for this represents blocking all ARP packets, except
those coming from the bridge, at the level of the scanner VM.
Worth mentioning is the method via which the components
mentioned above connect with one another. Each virtual ma-
chine receives a tun/tap interface onto which it attaches. Next,
this interface connects to the bridge of the virtual network. At
the level of non-VM hosts, namely the network namespaces
which contain solely a network interface configuration and
NAT redirection rules, communication takes place using so-
called veth pairs. More exactly, upon creation, a network
namespace receives a network interface which communicates
via a tunnel with a pair interface in the default network
namespace. In turn, the veth pair interface connects to the
virtual network bridge (as seen in Fig. 1).
As far as networking is concerned, the critical aspect of
Internet access requires debate. While most SDN solutions,
such as Mininet[7] place network isolation high on their list
of priorities, the security researcher utilizing our framework
might make it adamant that their setup requires connections
towards outside networks. The entire architecture from Fig-
ure 1 lies encapsulated in a laptop running Linux. Namely,
upon creation of the virtual network, the laptop presents the
following interfaces: mybridge: the virtual network gateway,
3 tun/tap interfaces: for the 3 virtual machines in our test
Fig. 2: An illustration of the interfaces and the firewall of the
host laptop running Linux. The devices in the area delimited
by the interrupted rectangle lie on the OS of the laptop itself.
setup, and a number of veth interfaces equal to twice the
number of virtual, non-VM hosts. For obvious reasons, on a
complete virtual network setup, only the veth interfaces from
the default namespace appear when listing the interfaces on the
laptop (Figure 1 shows exactly the encapsulations at network
namespace level). The other half of veth interfaces became
configured accordingly to the virtual network and pushed in
their specific network namespaces corresponding to each non-
VM host. Given the external network access issue described
earlier, and also the structure of the underlying system, let us
commence with describing the flow of outbound connections
originating in our virtual network.
Based on Figure 2, we can observe that the Linux Firewall
lying on the host operating system establishes whether the
virtual network we created can initiate communication towards
an external network via Ethernet or WiFi. Note that complete
isolation may exist, and that in our approach, having Inter-
net connectivity works only with outbound connections, all
inbound traffic being blocked.
C. Functionality-wise Architecture
For better illustrating the functionality-wise architecture, an
attack scenario and the following steps shall be described.
The security researcher runs an infected file on the attacker
virtual machine. The sample ran aims at scanning the local
network. It shall detect as victims the victim virtual machine
and the non-VM, virtual redirector nodes that solely map
onto their own ports services that must be installed on the
victim machine. The scanner virtual machine receives the
entire network traffic and could also trigger detections. The
security researcher performs a complete reset of the virtual
machines, but not before collecting the network capture, which
needs manual inspection for new attack signatures to be added
to the scanner virtual machine.
Functionality-wise, from its inception phase, our framework
aimed at ease of use, automation, and possibility of reconfig-
uration even when the virtual machines already performed a
complete boot-up, without the requirement of their restart.
One of the advantages our solution brings, represents the
series of validations prior to creation of the virtual network.
More precisely, MAC addresses of all the interfaces to be
created and added must not match any existing ones on the
system. At IP level, validation takes place such that there exists
no overlap of the IPv4 range of a network-to-be and existing
ones.
An Object-Oriented abstraction was added, such that end
users can utilize the framework with disregard to specificities
underlying services invoke. Implementation-wise, we chose
to utilize Python, due to ease in performing network-specific
calculations, such as inferring the number of hosts, gateway
IPv4 address or performing programmatic inquiry of existing
network interfaces on the host machine.
Since our solution utilizes a series of virtual machines, we
chose as virtualization software the Linux build of VirtualBox,
as it provides the much entailed Command-Line Interface
interaction. Moreover, it being open-source assures ease of
use backed up by a large on-line community.
Programmatically, the user needs to provide a series of
scenario-specific parameters, such as IPv4 address of the
network and its netmask, MAC addresses, names of net-
work interfaces and also NAT redirections. For our series
of scenarios, the user also needs to provide configuration
parameters for the collection of NICs in Figure 1, except the
NICs responsible for interconnecting the network namespaces
to the default network namespace, since they receive unique
automated names and MAC addresses. By default, a virtual
network created using our framework prepares the network
and the VMs, there existing the requirement that the user
chooses which of the available IPv4 addresses to allocate to
virtual, non-VM hosts, and also what service redirections to
perform at the level of each one (earlier we described that each
one can provide an entire collection of redirections towards
real services installed on the victim VM). Taking into account
that the network aims at being used by a human actor in
security research, DHCP reservations represent a feature. In
our series of runs, we chose a convention that victim, attacker
and scanner receive the last 3 IP addresses in the network to
be created.
Provided parameters choice took place, current state of
each VM gets assessed, after which follows their network-
wise configuration at OSI layer 1 and 2, regardless of them
being switched on or off. In our specific case, tun/tap adapters
receive the desired identification MAC and name. For our runs,
we then prompted the user with the task of choosing the visibil-
ity of the virtual network. More exactly, as Figure 2 shows, one
must choose a NIC of the host device for assuring connectivity
towards the Internet. At this step there exists the possibility of
choosing complete isolation of the virtual network, taking into
account the possibility of malicious traffic occurring during its
use afterwards. Next follows the configuration of firewall and
interfaces, after which the software calculates IPv4 specific
parameters, and prepares a list of available IPv4 addresses.
Having presented the architecture of our framework both
network-wise, and at software level, we continue by illustrat-
ing functionality of the API exposed. As stated earlier, given
the variety of use cases, there exist no restrictions regarding
the structure of the virtual network to be created. Let us con-
sider a scenario of the security researcher creating a network
containing the 3 virtual machines mentioned earlier. Initially,
the network of choice for creation might be characterized by
the input parameters presented in Figure 3.
bridgeName = "mybridge"
tunTapNameVictim = "tunVictim"
tunTapNameAttacker = "tunAttacker"
tunTapNameScanner = "tunScanner"
testIP = "192.165.15.0"
testNM = "255.255.255.240"
testMACBridge = "00:50:56:c0:aa:01"
testMACTapVictim = "00:60:67:34:12:44"
testMACTapAttacker = "00:60:67:34:12:55"
testMACTapScanner = "00:60:67:34:12:66"
Fig. 3: User added configuration parameters for the virtual
network to be created.
The framework proceeds with configuration of all virtual
hosts, followed by employing the user-established level of
isolation of the network to be created. With a successful run
of the solution, the output ought to be similar to the one
illustrated in Figure 4.
Mynet:
bridgeName : mybridge
tunTapName#1 : tunVictim
tunTapName#2 : tunAttacker
tunTapName#3 : tunScanner
hostInterfaceName: wlp2s0
nwAddress : 192.165.15.0
netmask : 255.255.255.240
_cidr : 28
_broadcast : 192.165.15.15
_gateway : 192.165.15.1
_maxHosts : 14
Fig. 4: Information inferred by the framework based on the
input parameters given.
The framework user needs to consider the number of
additional non-VM hosts the network currently supports. In
our specific use case, 11 slots left for IPv4 addresses assure
a relatively limited sized network. An example of populating
the network programmatically can be seen in Figure 5.
As seen below, adding hosts to a virtual network using our
framework becomes accessible via custom wrapper functions
which perform specific Linux networking tasks such as cre-
ation of networking artifacts, address assigning, and perform-
ing NAT redirections towards the victim from a non-VM host.
Let us consider that a certain number of hosts were added, each
exposing a number of service redirections towards the victim.
If the user considers more hosts are to be added, changing the
futureHostIP = myNet.availableIPs[0]
addVethHost(myNet, futureHostIP)
redirectPort(aNetwork = myNet,
fromIP = str(futureHostIP),
fromPort = "2121",
toIP = str(IPReservationVictim),
toPort = "21")
Fig. 5: An example of API usage: adding a new non-VM host,
which also maps its port 2121 to port 21 of the victim machine,
using NAT.
netmask from 255.255.255.240 to one allowing more hosts
existing, such as 255.255.255.0 can take place by changing
the netmask of the network and rerunning the creation script.
Hosts and their redirections coded in so far remain available
on network reset. Advantages the implementation presents are
the fact that it takes a short time for reconfiguring the entire
system forming our virtual network. In addition, changing the
network address to a completely different one, like for example
10.10.10.0 and renaming interfaces can also take place. The
key for speed lies in the fact that the virtual machines need
not restart for complete reconfiguration, and virtual non-VM
hosts have a low footprint.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Attack Scenarios
Our validation phase, with accent placed on threats analysis,
consisted of creating a virtual network whose network traffic
to contain specific attack types, such as brute-force, but also
reconnaissance activity, such as port scanning.
1) Port Redirections Towards Victim for Attacker Luring:
The listing shown in Figure 7, taken from the attacker ma-
chine, represents an output of a network scan, performed using
the nmap tool, with the following mapping scripted into a
Python dictionary prior to virtual network creation. For each
tuple seen in Figure 6, the first item represents a port of a
virtual redirector host, and the second one, the port of the
victim virtual machine, which needs to host the services.
redirDict[2]=[(11,21),(22,22),(33,23)]
redirDict[3]=[(44,23),(55,25),(66,53),
(77,80), (88,111)]
redirDict[4]=[(99,139),(100,445),(110,514),
(120,514),(130, 1524)]
redirDict[5]=[(140,2049),(150,2121),(160,3306),
(170,3632),(180,5432)]
Fig. 6: Port redirections towards victim. Each array offset
represents the ordinal of a non-VM virtual network host.
2) Brute Force and Port Scanning Detection: A test sce-
nario for validating the functionality of our framework in-
volved creating a number of 4 virtual hosts that perform NAT
redirection on port 21 towards the victim virtual machine.
From the attacker VM, we ran a script which launches into
Nmap scan r e p o r t f o r 192.165.15.2
Host i s up ( 0 . 0 0 0 5 9 s l a t e n c y ) .
Not shown: 167 c l o s e d p o r t s
PORT STATE SERVICE
11/tcp open systat
22/tcp open ssh
33/tcp open dsp
MAC Address: CA: 9 9 : 1D: 6 E : E3 : 7D ( Unknown )
Nmap scan r e p o r t f o r 192.165.15.3
Host i s up ( 0 . 0 0 0 4 9 s l a t e n c y ) .
Not shown: 165 c l o s e d p o r t s
PORT STATE SERVICE
44/tcp open mpm-flags
55/tcp open isi-gl
66/tcp open sqlnet
77/tcp open priv-rje
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
MAC Address: 5E : 2 5 : B9 : 7 3 : F7 : B9 ( Unknown )
Nmap scan r e p o r t f o r 192.165.15.4
Host i s up ( 0 . 0 0 0 4 9 s l a t e n c y ) .
Not shown: 165 c l o s e d p o r t s
PORT STATE SERVICE
99/tcp open metagram
100/tcp open newacct
110/tcp open pop3
120/tcp open cfdptkt
130/tcp open cisco-fna
MAC Address: 1 6 :CC: 9 F : FA :CA: A7 ( Unknown )
Nmap scan r e p o r t f o r 192.165.15.5
Host i s up ( 0 . 0 0 0 4 2 s l a t e n c y ) .
Not shown: 165 c l o s e d p o r t s
PORT STATE SERVICE
140/tcp open emfis-data
150/tcp open sql-net
160/tcp open sgmp-traps
170/tcp open print-srv
180/tcp open ris
MAC Address: 32 :6 F : E3 : 2C: 4 7 : 8 6 ( Unknown )
Fig. 7: An example of port scanning output with a virtual
network we built with custom NAT bindings to real services
existing on the victim virtual machine.
execution 4 instances of the Hydra brute force tool, targets
being the four virtual hosts. Results shown on the security
panel of the scanner VM appear in a timely manner, showing
the detection: ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt
with the source IP being a each virtual host, and the victim
VM as destination.
Port scanning also triggers an alarm in our scanner,
promiscuous-mode connected VM, and what is more, on
launching a complex scan from the attacker VM (see [12]),
many attack signatures trigger reactions at the level of the
scanner VM, including detection of binary payloads.
B. Performance
The first scenario for performance evaluation consists of
analyzing the time required to add increasingly more virtual
non-VM hosts to our network. We chose the network address
192.165.0.0/16, and added a number of 998 virtual hosts, each
performing the following 5 NAT service redirections:
• 99/tcp filtered metagram
• 100/tcp filtered newacct
• 110/tcp filtered pop3
• 120/tcp filtered cfdptkt
• 130/tcp filtered cisco-fna
The resulting number of hosts in the virtual network,
counting the bridge, the three VMs and out non-VM virtual
hosts, is 1002. With IP reservation for VMs victim, attacker
and scanner being 192.165.255.252 - 192.165.255.254, the IP
range of non-VM hosts is 192.165.0.2 - 192.165.3.231
The plot below shows the behavior in time of the host
operating system, as more non-VM virtual hosts are added
to the virtual network.
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Fig. 8: Running time by the number of hosts added to the
network.
While the plot from Figure 8 shows that adding a virtual
redirector non-VM host takes roughly one second, this is
because the host operating system requires a considerable
number of transactions to take place while configuring routes,
interfaces and rules. In addition, resetting the network state
only targets virtual machines, since virtual redirecting non-
VM hosts solely redirect to services installed onto the victim
virtual machine. The similar framework Mininet [7] requires
a similar amount of time for virtual non-VM host creation.
The second scenario consists of automated running of
malware Windows PE infected samples, in order to obtain
a capture of their network traffic. The time required to run a
sample depends on the activity of the infected program. With
the virtual network already created, once malware activity
took place, it only takes a few seconds to collect the network
traffic capture file, and restore state of virtual machines to their
pre-attack status, using snapshots. Therefore, within an hour,
leaving each malware sample a time frame of 5 minutes, and
with a time of 5 seconds to restore virtual machine snapshots
for victim, attacker and scanner and save a *.pcap network
capture from scanner or bridge level, an hour would allow
collecting network traffic from 11 infected programs. While
appearing as a tedious process, malware research usually needs
to allocate time for malware to manifest, 5 minutes being
considered a reasonable timespan.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Sandboxes are powerful tools for dynamic cyberthreats
analysis but analyzing a threat in an isolated virtual machine
is not enough to reveal the entire attack potential. We have
proposed a framework that addresses this issue by employing
software-defined networking concepts.
Our framework can be used to define a custom virtual
network that resembles an entire home network or even a
corporate network. The framework architecture was presented
both network-wise and functionality-wise, describing the con-
figurations that a user can perform in order to achieve the
desired results.
Experimental results showed that the proposed system is
able to detect common network attacks, while being able to
simulate even large networks (1000 virtual hosts) on commod-
ity hardware.
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